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Headline: Intelligent Agency Study calls bombing of North Vietnam a political, military failure.

Subhead: Survey strengthens hand of opponents of raid--change unlikely, however, unless Hanoi makes concessions.

By Richard Dudman, a Washington Correspondent of the Post Dispatch. Dateline Washington December 23.

A survey by government intelligence agency has concluded that the American bombing of North Vietnam is a political and military failure.

The survey is the latest of a series of evaluations by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon Defense Intelligence Agency. Although its details are classified, congressional and administration sources have been willing to discuss its overall conclusion.

The findings strengthen the hands of those who seek a halt to the bombing either unilaterally or as part of an appeal to both sides. These include Pope Paul VI, United Nations Secretary General U Thant, Senate Democratic Majority leader Mike Mansfield, and Senator Frank Church.

On the political side, the survey is said to find that the bombing has clearly failed to accomplish its major objective--to inflict sufficient punishment on North Vietnam to persuade it to stop supporting the war of the South or go further and seek peace talks.

Militarily, the air attacks have failed to impede significantly the growing streams of men and supplies from North Vietnam into the South, the survey is said to show.

The raids are said to be described as an inconvenience or annoyance to North Vietnam rather than a substantial obstacle to the infiltration.

This interpretation differs from the public appraisal usually given by administration officials. They emphasize that the bombing requires the Communists to assign hundreds of thousands of men to repair bridges, roads, railroads and installations and suggest that the raids limit somewhat the rate of infiltration.

The survey, on the contrary, is said to minimize military importance of the reconstruction burdens and to deny that the bombing restricts infiltrations to any substantial degree.

What the bombing restricts is the capacity of the infiltration routes, rather than the amount of infiltration. Because the routes never have carried full capacity, the flow of men in arms has not been significantly affected, it is said.

When the bombing began in February 1965, the official estimate of infiltration was 1,500 men a month. Secretary of Defense Robert S. MacNamara predicted that the number would reach 4,500 by the end of the year.

As the bombing was intensified, the infiltration increased. The official estimate is that at least 6,400 and possibly as many as 8,800 North Vietnamese crossed into South Vietnam each month between January and July of this year. Tentative figures for August, September, and October, show a much lower rate, but American officials contribute the apparent drop to a time lag in identifying newly arrived units.

Results of the survey can be used as reason either for stepping up the bombing or for abandoning it. At its present rate, the bombing can be defended chiefly as a morale booster for the Saigon Government or as something to be traded for some conciliatory action by North Vietnam.

Informed officials caution against expecting the United States to agree to any extended unilateral suspension of the bombing, even though it's considered valueless in achieving political or military goals. They point out that the Johnson Administration is firmly committed to the principle that a bombing pause must be accompanied by some sign of reciprocal action by the other side, such as the halting in infiltration or scaling down the attack of the South. Nonetheless, some high officials have been emphasizing the short comings of the bombing strategy. Arthur J. Goldberg, in his speech last week at a closed session with the council of Foreign Relations, gave

listeners the impression that he considers the bombing raids a mistake. MacNamara is said to refer often, in private conversations, to their meager effect.

There has been some talk to congressional circles of calling for creation of a blue ribbon commission to appraise the whole bombing strategy. This would be on the grounds that most of the current appraising is done by the Air Force, and interested parties.

Support for continued bombing has come largely from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are said to have virtually automatic support from Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Walt W. Rostow, special assistant to the President who specializes in national security matters. Rostow was an early leading advocate of the bombing strategy.

Some observers consider that Rusk supports the Joint Chiefs, on occasions when MacNamara is recommending restraint, blurs what would otherwise be a debate between military diplomatic aspects of the situation.

Clark Clifford, a Washington Lawyer who has been an important consultant to President John F. Kennedy and to President Lyndon B. Johnson, is said to advocate stronger military measures.

Clifford, the former St. Louisian, is head of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Although this does

not make him an ex-official member of the Nations Security Council he usually attends these formal meetings as well as its fall and formal sessions.